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This paper discusses the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on
market entry and welfare. It assumes that rms may enter markets in the
rst period as national rms only. In the second period, however, FDI is
possible. The paper demonstrates that FDI reduces market entry because
equilibrium prots in the second period decline with a decrease in the
xed cost of FDI. Therefore, compared to a trade regime without any FDI,
prices rise in the rst period but decline in the second period. The paper
shows, however, that FDI will unambiguously improve the discounted sum
of consumer surplus.
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This paper discusses the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on market
structure and welfare in a two period model in which national rms may enter
an international market in the rst period and { once they have entered {
decide on FDI in the second period. The paper shows that equilibria are
possible in which both national and multinational rms are active. If both
types of rms coexist or if only multinational rms are active in the second
period, the paper nds that FDI will reduce the number of entering rms
in the rst period because entering rms anticipate that competition in the
second period will be the tougher the more multinational enterprises will
then be active. The decrease in entering national rms increases equilibrium
prices in the rst period, but FDI decreases the equilibrium price in the
second period. Compared with a trade regime under which FDI is banned,
FDI will thus lead to welfare losses in the rst period but to welfare gains
in the second period. If consumers use the same discount factor as rms,
the paper shows that FDI unambiguously improves the discounted sum of
consumer surplus.
The paper is motivated by the fact that the welfare eects of FDI are not
exhaustively understood compared to the welfare eects of trade although
FDI seems to be more the driving force of globalization than trade.1 An
exemption is De Santis and St ahler (2002) who show that FDI is welfare
improving compared to trade if national and multinational rms may locate
in each country. However, they also demonstrate that coexistence of national
and multinational rms is not possible if countries are symmetric. Other pa-
pers on FDI and trade like Markusen and Veneable (1998, 2000) use a similar
1The literature distinguishes between horizontal FDI, that is, a rm sets up a further
plant in the foreign country and keeps the plant in the home country running (Markusen,
1984; Horstmann and Markusen, 1992; Brainard, 1993; Markusen and Venables 1998, 2000)
and vertical FDI, where the home plant is shut down instead (Helpman, 1984; Helpman
and Krugman, 1985). The motive for horizontal FDI is to avoid trade costs, whereas the
motive for vertical FDI is to exploit dierences in factor prices and endowment. Empirical
evidence suggests that FDI is dominantly of the rst type (Brainard, 1997; Blonigen, 2001;,
Markusen, 1998, Markusen and Maskus, 2001) because most of the world-wide FDI takes
place among industrialized countries which do not dier substantially.
1model structure but in a general equilibrium setting. They solve their model
by numerical simulations and show that coexistence may ocur if countries
are asymmetric.
This paper uses a similar approach as Horstmann and Markusen (1992)
and De Santis and St ahler (2002) to model horizontal FDI. The dierence to
De Santis and St ahler (2002) is that a rm cannot enter a new market as a
multinational rm right from the beginning because these coordination and
monitoring costs are prohibitively large. However, once they have entered,
they may decide on FDI in the future. In this setting, coexistence of both
types of rms is possible in equilibrium. Accordingly, the paper is organized
as follows: Section 2 will introduce the model and the structure of moves.
Section 3 will determine the equilibrium market structure. Section 4 will
present the impact of FDI on welfare. Section 5 will conclude.
2 The model
The model assumes two symmetric countries, a domestic country d and a
foreign country f, and two goods X and Y . Y is produced under perfect
competition and is the numeraire of the model. X is produced under imper-
fect competition, either by national rms or by multinational rms. There is
only one factor of production, L, which is normalized such than one unit of
L produces one unit of Y . The quasi-linear preferences of the representative
consumer are given by the utility function U(X;Y ) = aX bX2=2+Y which
is maximized subject to the budget constraint L +   pX + Y , where 
denotes the prots realized by rms having their headquarters within the
country of the representative consumer. p denotes the price of X in terms of
the numeraire. Maximization yields the inverse demand function p = a bX
for each country. Markets are assumed to be segmented but our results will
also hold for integrated markets as long as rms may distinguish between
production for the home market and production for the foreign market.
The marginal cost of production of good X is c, and shipping this good
from one country to the other has trade cost t per unit. K will denote the
number of active rms in both countries. As usual in the trade literature,
2we will refer to those rms which serve the foreign market via exports as
national rms, and to those which serve the foreign market by a plant set
up in the foreign country as multinational rms. Multinational rms save
the trade costs t as they serve the foreign country with a plant set up in
this country but they have to sink xed cost for establishing the subsidiary
by FDI. This paper assumes that multinational rms are not established
immediately but that they have entered the market as national rms in the
past. The reason is that setting up headquarters and starting the production
process in one country alone is such challenging that the management is not
able to establish simultaneously a subsidiary in the other country. Thus, the
model assumes that foreign direct investment is possible only after a rm has
already entered the market as a national rm. In particular, we assume the
following sequence of decisions:
 Period 1
{ Firms decide on market entry. If a rm enters the markets, it sinks
cost F for setting up headquarters and one production plant in
the home country.
{ Each rm decides on output for the home market and exports.
 Period 2
{ Each rm decides on (horizontal) foreign direct investment. If a
rm becomes multinational, it sinks cost G for setting up one
production plant in the host country.
{ Each rm decides on output for the home market and output for
the foreign market.
From the viewpoint of period 1, the possibility of FDI in the second period
is an uncertain option so that G gives the expected cost to save trade costs
by establishing a subsidiary. The protability of FDI will depend on the size
of G, and it is then clear that FDI will be the more attractive the lower
3the expected G is. A reduction in the cost G will therefore be treated as an
exogenous shift which makes FDI potentially more attractive.
The game structure does not allow market entry in period 2. However,
this assumption is less restrictive as it seems at rst glance. The results do
not change if the model assumed that { once national and multinational
rms have been established { new rms may enter the market in a third
period, either as national or multinational rms. The reason could be that
the business has already reached a certain degree of maturity in period 3
so that simultaneously establishing a rm and a subsidiary is possible. The
potential market entry of rms in subsequent periods would then change the
protability to enter the market in the rst period but would aect all active
rms, irrespective of their type. If these eects were to be taken into account,
the discounted prots of further periods had be subtracted from the cost to
enter the market, F, without changing the basic results. Hence, the game
structure relies only upon the reasonable assumption that a new market can
be explored only by national rms in a rst step which then have a rst
mover advantage to establish subsidiaries before further multinational rms
may be established.
The decision on market entry will rest upon the prots to be expected in
these two period. In the rst period, rms may enter only as national rms.
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1) denotes rm output for the
domestic market (rm exports to the foreign market). If no second period
existed, the model would coincide with the reciprocal dumping model of
Brander (1981) and Brander, Krugman (1983).
In the second period, the cost F are sunk and of no further relevance.
But those rms which have entered the market will then decide on FDI. If a
domestic rm decides to remain a national rm, denoted by the superscript
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where the notation is similar to those used in eq. (1). In period 2, however,
the rm may also decide to become multinational in order to save trade costs
by making an investment with cost G. If a domestic rm goes for FDI, its











2   G: (3)
The superscript m denotes the multinational rm. Note that x
mf
2 does
not denote exports but the production for the foreign market by a plant set
up in the foreign country. In the remainder of the paper, M will denote the
number of multinational rms in both countries, for which 0  M  K, and
hence K   M is the number of national rms in both countries. Since both
countries are symmetric, the number of active national and multinational
rms in each country is M=2 and (K   M)=2, respectively. The subsequent
section will determine the equilibrium number of rms.
3 Endogenous market structures under trade
and FDI
This section will begin with analyzing the equilibrium market structure in
period 2. In period 2, market entry is not possible but rms may be of na-
tional or multinational type. Solving for the f.o.c.'s of (2) and (3) determines
the maximized prots of national and multinational rms which yield the
following lemma.
Lemma 1 If market entry has occurred in period 1, national rms and multi-
national rms may coexist in period 2.
Proof: If both types of rms coexist, the second period prots will be equal-
ized in equilibrium. Otherwise, a single rm has an incentive to switch its
type unilaterally. Equalizing prots yields
5(a   c + 0:5t(K   M))2
b(K + 1)2   G =
(a   c   t   0:5t(K   M)   tM)2
b(K + 1)2 (4)
where the term on the LHS (RHS) of eq. (4) gives the prots of a multina-




t(2(a   c)   t)   bG(K + 1)
t2 : (5)
Obviously, the larger G, the lower will M be. In particular, no multina-
tional rm will be established, that is, M = 0, if G is equal to
G =
t(2(a   c)   t)
b(K + 1)
: (6)
No rm will remain to be of the national type, that is, M = K, if G is
equal to
G =
t(2(a   c)   (K + 1)t)
b(K + 1)
: (7)
The proof for possible coexistence is complete if G may lie between these
two bounds which is in fact possible:
G   G =
Kt2
b(K + 1)
> 0:  (8)
Note that the range G   G is the larger the lower K is. The reason is
that multinational rms have to cover more xed costs, and hence they have
to be larger in terms of aggregate output than national rms. In particular,
they produce more for the foreign market via the plant set up in the host
country than they would export as a national rm. However, if the market
is already crowded with a lot of rivals, a multinational can hardly be that
protable because it has to compete also with foreign national rms in the
foreign country which are not at a cost disadvantage.
As it seems to be reasonable to consider the cases in which national
and multinational rms coexist, the remainder of the paper assumes that
6G is suciently large so that not only mulitnational rms will be active in
period 2.
Assumption 1 G  G.
Assumption 1 guarantees that both types of rms coexist as long as
G  G. In this case, the equilibrium prots of both the national and the
multinational rm can be computed by inserting (5) into the LHS (or the




Firms deciding on market entry in the rst period will correctly anticipate
these equilibrium prots of period 2. Note carefully that the equilibrium
prots decrease with the expected xed cost G to become a multinational
rm. In other words, the less protable FDI is, the larger are the second
period equilibrium prots. The reason is a business stealing eect which
makes all rm suer from FDI. All rms would prefer to remain national
rms, but a single rm has an incentive to defect since it is able to increase its
prots unilaterally. If a single rm has an incentive to become multinational,
it will expand output for the foreign market and will thus reduce the prots of
national rms. However, further multinational rms will then be established
until prots are equalized. 2 Therefore, prots will be reduced for both types
of rms compared to the case that all rms remained national rm.
The market entry decision in period 1 will also depend on the equilibrium
prots in period 1. Since only national rms will be active then, using the
f.o.c.'s of the maximization exercise concerning (1) leads to prots of
1 =
(a   c + 0:5tK)2
b(K + 1)2 +
(a   c   t   0:5tK)2
b(K + 1)2   F: (10)
The range of F should be restricted such that
2This eect can also be observed from (1) because both the LHS of (1), that is, the
prots of a multinational rm, and the RHS of (1), that is, the prots of a national rm,
decrease with M.
7Assumption 2
b2G2 + (1 + )t4
2bt2 < F <
b2G2 + (1 + )t4
2bt2 +
2(a   c)(a   c   2t) + t2
2b
holds which will ensure a feasible solution. Market entry occurs until the
discounted sum of expected prots over both periods is zero, that is
1 + 2 = 0; 0 <  < 1; (11)
where  denotes the (common) discount factor by which rms take the
second period prots into account in period 1. Eq. (11) allows to discuss the
impact of FDI on market structure.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium number of active rms decreases with the
cost of foreign direct investment.
Proof: Under the use of (10) and (11), the equilibrium number of rms en-
tering the markets in period 1 is
K
 =
(a   c) + (a   c   t)
p
2b(F   2)   t2   1: (12)
Since 2 depends positively upon G (see (9)), K decreases with G. As-
sumption 2 guarantees that 0 < K < 1: 
Proposition 1 shows that FDI leads to less market entry because rms
anticipate that FDI leads to more competition in the future. Thus, market
concentration occurs. Under the use of K, multinational rms will become











This section will now explore how FDI will change welfare. The reference
point for the comparison is a pure trade regime under which FDI is not
8possible, for instance because capital controls eectively ban FDI. Then, the
FDI ban is lifted, and rms may become multinational in the second period.
Analytically, the welfare eects will be explored by considering a reduction
in the xed cost of foreign direct investment, G. This can be best understood
as taking G as the starting point for which FDI will not occur. Then, the
expected xed cost of FDI is reduced and the change in welfare with this
reduction can be determined. Furthermore, this section will assume that the
discount factor used by rms coincides with the discount factors used by the
representative consumer and any social planner. Then, as rms will enter in
the rst period until the discounted sum of prots is equal to zero, only the
impact of FDI on consumer surplus matters. The rst result shows that FDI
does not unambiguously change welfare in both periods.
Proposition 2 If an FDI{trade regime replace a pure trade regime, prices
rise in the rst period but decline in the second period.
Proof: The f.o.c.'s for (1), (2) and (3) and the equilibrium values for M and
K (see (5) and (12)) allow to compute the aggregate output in each market
for each period, that is,
X1 =
2(a   c)   t  
p








and the equilibrium prices in each market in each period, that is,
p1 = c +
t +
p
2b(F   2)   t2
2
(16)




As 2 depends positively upon G (see 9), p1 decreases with G. The eect
on p2 is obvious from (17). 
Since consumer surplus is negatively related to prices, Proposition 2 shows
that FDI will reduce the rst period welfare but will increase the second pe-
riod welfare. The possibility to make an FDI lets rms anticipate the business
9stealing eect in the second period. This business stealing eect reduces the
second period equilibrium prots, and hence less rms will enter in the rst
period. Consequently, market concentration implies higher prices. In the sec-
ond period, however, the business stealing eect is benecial for consumers,
because multinationals increase aggregate production and thus reduce prices.
As the impact on welfare is not unambiguous for each period, the next result
demonstrates the aggregate welfare eect over both periods.
Proposition 3 Foreign direct investment unambiguously improves the dis-
counted sum of consumer surplus.
Proof: Due to the quasi-linear preferences, the discounted sum of consumer



















t2   (1 + )t2
(19)
with




t2   (1 + )t2 (20)
Note that the root in the denominator is unambiguously positive due to
Assumption 2 (K < 1 requires 2bF   b2G2
t2   (1 + )t2 if 2 is replaced
by (9) in (12)). Therefore, the sign of dCS=dG depends on (G). If (G) is
negative, the change of CS with G is negative. Note that






t2   (1 + )t2
> 0: (21)
Furthermore
(G) = 0: (22)
10Hence,  is negative if multinational rms are active, and thus CS de-
creases with G. 
Proposition 3 demonstrates that the decrease in the rst period consumer
surplus is outnumbered by the increase in the second period consumer sur-
plus. This is a remarkable result because it shows that welfare will rise despite
the fact that FDI will lead to market concentration and higher prices in the
rst period.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has set up a model in which rms start their business as export-
ing, that is, national rms and may become multinational later on. It has
demonstrated that coexistence of national and multinational rms is then
possible. Furthermore, it has shown that FDI may lead to less entry into new
markets compared to a trade regime under which FDI is banned. The option
of FDI in future periods reduces the prots of rms as competition will be
tougher then, and this eect is anticipated by potentially entering rms. As
a result, prices will rise in the rst period, but will decline in future periods
compared to a pure trade regime. Although welfare thus declines today but
rises tomorrow, the paper has shown that FDI unambiguously improves the
discounted sum of consumer surplus and hence welfare as prots are zero in
equilibrium.
The paper has demonstrated that this two period model can partially
conrm the public concerns about possible market concentration as a result
of the emergence of multinational rms. It has shown this result in a set-
ting in which multinational rms cannot compete with national rms when
new markets are explored. It is true that the future option of FDI will un-
ambiguously lead to market concentration and less consumer surplus today.
However, these eects are only the rst part of the story. In the future, con-
sumers benet from multinational enterprises as this type of rms will be
closer to the markets compared to exporting rms and competition will be
tougher. The paper has shown that allowing FDI and reducing welfare to-
day may pay o because the future welfare increase is larger than the recent
11welfare loss.
References
Blonigen, B.A. (2001), In search of substitution between foreign production
and exports, Journal of International Economics, 53: 81-104.
Brainard, S.L. (1993), 'A simple theory of multinational corporations and
trade with a trade-o between proximity and concentration', NBER
Working Paper, n. 4269.
Brainard, S. L. (1997), 'An empirical assessment of the proximity-
concentration trade-o between multinational sales and trade', Amer-
ican Economic Review, 87: 520-540.
Brander, J.A. (1981), 'Intra-industry trade in identical commodities', Jour-
nal of International Economics, 11: 1-14.
Brander, J.A., Krugman, P.R. (1983), 'A "reciprocal dumping" model of
international trade', Journal of International Economics, 15: 313-323.
De Santis, R., St ahler, F. (2002), 'Endogenous market structures and the
gains from foreign direct investment', mimeo.
Dunning, J.H. (1977), 'Trade, location of economic activity and MNE: A
search for an eclectic approach', in Ohlin, B., Hesselborn, P.O., Wijk-
man, P.M. (eds.), The International Allocation of Economic Activity,
London, Macmillan.
Helpman, E. (1984), 'A simple theory of trade with multinational corpora-
tions', Journal of Political Economy, 92: 451-571.
Helpman, E., Krugman, P.R. (1985), Market Structure and Foreign Trade,
MIT Press, Cambridge.
Horstmann, I.J., Markusen, J.R. (1992), 'Endogenous market structures
in international trade (natura facit saltum)', Journal of International
Economics, 32: 109-129.
12Markusen, J.R. (1984), 'Multinationals, multi-plant economies, and the
gains from trade', Journal of International Economics, 16: 205-226.
Markusen, J.R. (1998), 'Multinational rms, location and trade', World
Economy, 21: 733-756.
Markusen, J.R., Maskus, K.E. (2001), 'Discriminating among alternative
theories of the multinational enterprise', in: M. Blomstrom, L. Gold-
berg (eds.), Topics in Empirical International Economics, Chicago Uni-
versity Press, Chicago.
Markusen, J.R., Venables, A.J. (1998), 'Multinational rms and the new
trade theory', Journal of International Economics, 46: 183-203.
Markusen, J.R. and Venables, A.J. (2000), The theory of endowment, intra-
industry, and multinational trade, Journal of International Economics,
52: 209-234.
13